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Deutschland, Deutschland iiber Alles 
Uber Alles in der Welt 
-August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben 
The merger of the two Germanys on October 3, 1990, demon-
strates the power of political ideas reinforced by constitutional lan-
guage. The constitutional document of West Germany had always 
contained a cornerstone calling for reunification, echoing the call 
for a united Germany cited above. Like the corporate mergers 
which regularly took place over the past few years, this consolida-
tion called forth a host of legal problems, many of constitutional 
dimension. It also illustrated again the intractibility and universal-
ity of key constitutional issues around the world. 
The unification of Germany began when the German Demo-
cratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik or DDR) di-
vided itself into five statesi (plus a part-state, East Berlin). These 
were then absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany under 
the provisions of article 23 of its Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which 
permitted "any German state" to accede to the federal union. The 
former German Democratic Republic thus passed into a well-mer-
ited oblivion. As one of its last acts, however, the DDR entered 
into a Treaty of German Unity (Vertrag zur deutschend Einheit) 
with the Federal Republic that has interesting constitutional 
implications. 
I. THE MERGER 
A little history may be useful. Until well into the nineteenth 
century, "Germany" was little more than a geographic designation. 
German territory was ruled by a variety of princes, dukes, and sen-
• Oppenheimer, Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
I. The five new states are: Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sach-
sen-Anhalt and Thiiringen. 
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ates, subject only to the rudimentary central authority of the Holy 
Roman Empire, which Voltaire once described as "neither holy, nor 
Roman, nor an empire. "2 The passage quoted at the heading of this 
article-now part of the German national anthem3-was originally 
a plea for a Supremacy Clause, a call for national superiority over 
local fiefdoms, not for German superiority over foreign lands. This 
Deutschland was to be supreme over Saxony and Bavaria and all the 
other principalities. The sense of nation had emerged, but the na-
tion-state was not yet there. Efforts toward creation of a German 
state in 1848-9 failed with the demise of the Pau/skirche constitu-
tion, but a federalist state evolved in the period of Bismarck later in 
the century. In the Weimar Republic, which followed World War 
I, elements of federalism remained, only to be abolished by the 
Equalization Law4 of the Third Reich, which required state legisla-
tures to have the same (Nazi-dominated) composition as the na-
tional government. Soon after, even this pretext of federalism, like 
the pretext of democracy, was either ignored or abolished. 
In the aftermath of World War II, Germany was divided into 
four occupation zones. In the three Western zones, the Allies cre-
ated state governments corresponding roughly to the larger states of 
Weimar Germany, although once-dominant Prussia was broken 
into its separate provinces. Russia maintained more direct control 
of its Eastern sector. With the encouragement of Britain, France 
and the United States, delegates of the western state legislatures met 
in Bonn in 1949 to draft a temporary constitution for their part of 
Germany, to be effective until reunification could take place. That 
document was called a Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and not a constitu-
tion (Verfassung) to emphasize its transitory character. The Basic 
Law retained many links with the constitutional traditions of Ger-
many such as an administrative federalism and a parliamentary sys-
tem. It also contained innovations suggested or demanded by the 
Western Allies, such as an explicit bill of rights, a guarantee of judi-
cial review, and provisions to preclude parliamentary stalemate. 
The Russians refused to permit their sector to participate. 
They soon responded with a constitution of a separate (and presum-
ably permanent) German Democratic Republic. The DDR Consti-
tution was revised and replaced in 1968. Over the years, the DDR 
abolished the traditional states in its territory and formed differ-
2. Voltaire, Essai sur /es Moeurs et /'£spirit des Nations, lxx. 
3. The passage technically is still part of the national anthem. Only the third verse, 
which speaks of "unity and law and freedom" is sung at official functions, because of the 
possibility for misunderstanding. 
4. Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Lander mit dem Reich, [1933] Reichsgesetzblatt 
153, 173. 
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ently constituted administrative districts, in part to weaken any 
claim of separatism. 
The West German Basic Law provided two different mecha-
nisms for additional areas to join it. Article 23 not only provided 
that the Basic Law would initially be effective in the western states, 
but also that: "In other parts of Germany, it will take effect upon 
their joining [the Federal Republic]." This permitted their unilat-
eral accession to the institutions of West Germany. The other pro-
vision, article 146, allowed a wholly new constitution to be adopted 
by popular vote "of the German people." It provided that the Basic 
Law would cease to have effect whenever the whole German people 
adopted a constitution in a free election, presumably without con-
formity to the other procedures for amendment of the Basic Law 
itself. Neither provision carefully delimited the scope of "other 
parts of Germany" or "the German people." 
The supposed transitory character of the West German Basic 
Law and the alleged permanence of their own "constitution" led 
East German commentators to disparage the "incomplete" charac-
ter of the West German constitutional structure. The events of late 
1989 demonstrated that the democratic character (and, perhaps, the 
economic success) of West Germany could prevail over such sterile 
formulations. But equally, the open-ended constitutional invitation 
to all Germans and German states to enter into the Federal Repub-
lic seems to have had a psychological effect in continuing the belief 
that a "single Germany" was only temporarily divided. 
In the early days after the overthrow of the old regime in East 
Germany, there was some discussion of the framing of a new all-
German constitution (using the formula of article 146 of the Basic 
Law to completely replace the 1949 Basic Law) in order to create a 
new beginning for a united Germany. Such thoughts rapidly gave 
way to an accession of the eastern area (subdivided into states) us-
ing the article 23 method. Time may have been the critical factor; 
the rapidly deteriorating economic condition in the East seemed to 
compel immediate action. The existing interpretations of constitu-
tional guarantees and procedures also provided greater legal and 
political certainty in a time of potential instability. The article 23 
methodology also provided a clear continuity of the international 
personality of the German Federal Republic as the "surviving 
state" in the merger. This was particularly important to insure that 
no renegotiation of German membership in the European Commu-
nities could be requested. 
East Germany was divided into five states, plus East Berlin. 
The five eastern states joined the ten western ones; the two Berlins 
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merged to form a sixteenth state in the expanded Federal Republic.5 
In addition to the accession, the two German governments ne-
gotiated a Treaty of German Unity, ratified by the parliaments of 
both nations in late September of 1990, which has a number of re-
markable provisions. It amends several articles of the Basic Law; it 
requires Parliament to amend several other articles within two 
years; it temporarily suspends the operation of several constitu-
tional provisions in the eastern area and provides that another pro-
vision will not be applied at all in certain circumstances. It also 
deals with that central issue of constitutional argument everywhere: 
abortion. 
This treaty, with its annexes and protocol, runs to more than 
1,000 typed pages. Most of that volume is dedicated to two annexes 
which deal with the unification of the East and West German legal 
systems. Procedures are established which will allow German law 
to be brought into force in an orderly way, so that reasonable expec-
tations are not upset, nor unrealistic transitional steps demanded. 
No one seems to question that the treaty will continue to be 
binding, even though the East German treaty partner faded into 
history on October 3, 1990. Since that date, it has ceased to be an 
agreement between sovereign states and is merely an agreement be-
tween Germany and itself. It may thus lose its status as interna-
tional law, but will continue to have effect in German law. Under 
the Basic Law, the ratification of treaties takes place by statute, 
rather than by a distinct "advice and consent" process.6 Constitu-
tional amendments use the same statutory procedure, merely re-
quiring a special majority.7 Therefore, passage of the law ratifying 
the treaty with the special majority required for constitutional 
amendment had the effect of amending-and suspending-large 
portions of the Basic Law. 
The treaty contains six constitutional amendments which take 
effect immediately.s One of these merely rewrites the preamble to 
the Basic Law to include the new states.9 Several others are of 
broader importance: 
5. West Berlin always had an anomalous position in preunification law, because of the 
continuation of occupation authority there. Some West German laws applied there, while 
others (e.g., the conscription law) did not. In the new structure, it will have a status 
equivalent to that of the other states. 
6. Basic Law, art. 59, paragraph 2. 
7. /d., art. 79. Certain constitutional principles, federalism and the basic protection of 
human dignity are unamendable. See art. 79, para. 3. 
8. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokra-
tizchen Repubik iiber der Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands, [1990] Bundesgesetzbatt, 
Teil II, 889. 
9. /d., art. 4, para. I. 
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- Article 23 of the Basic Law, the provision which was used to accomplish this 
merger, is repealed.IO It might be called "the clause which ate itself," since once 
utilized, it appeared to have no further purpose. In reality this repeal was intended 
as an external political message: Germany is again, in the view of its Basic Law, 
complete. Austrians need not worry about a future Anschluss, at least not about 
one which would be constitutional in German law. 
- Article 146, the alternative "merger" provision, is also amended to indicate 
that the current Basic Law now is "valid for the whole German people with the 
fulfillment of the unity and freedom of Germany."ll Again, this is intended to 
delimit the maximum territory of the German state. 
- New rules are established for apportioning seats in the Upper House of the 
German Parliament, the Bundesratl2 Each state formerly had three, four, or five 
votes, according to population. The amendment will give the four largest states, all 
in the West, an additional sixth vote. (Representatives in the Upper House are 
delegates of the state governments; each state casts all of its votes in a block). This 
will partially offset the additional voting power of the five relatively small eastern 
states. 
- The German Parliament is expressly given power to repudiate or reduce obli-
gations incurred by the DDR and its subordinate bodies.13 This provision was 
added to a nearly obsolete provision which had permitted a similar repudiation of 
the debts and obligations of the Third Reich. 
- In addition, there is an express provision for deviations from the require-
ments of the Basic Law in the former East German territory.14 Only the basic 
principles of human rights and the amendment process remain inviolable. Special 
provisions regarding the division of powers (and of taxes) between the federal and 
state governments can be suspended until the end of 1995; and other provisions can 
be disregarded until the end of 1992. A separate provision regulates the distribution 
of tax revenues, to guarantee sufficient funds for the new states to carry out their 
obligations. IS More extensive and detailed provisions of the treaty deal with ques-
tions of abortion and property rights, which are discussed below. 
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The most important exception, however, is the suspension of 
the guarantees of tenure in the civil service for public employees of 
the former DDR.t6 The underlying cause involved both doubts 
about the future attitude and political fidelity of some former DDR 
officials and a belief that the East German bureaucracy was bloated. 
(Among other techniques for resolution of this question is a special 
new early-retirement scheme-sometimes known as the "weapon of 
retirement"-which will temporarily lower retirement age to 57 in 
the eastern sector!)t7 
10. /d., art. 4, para. 2. 
II. /d., art. 4, para. 6. 
12. /d., art 4, para. 3 (amending Basic Law, art. 51, para. 2). 
13. /d., art 4, para. 4 (adding a new para. 2 to art. 135a of the Basic Law). 
14. /d., art. 4, para. 5. 
15. /d., art. 7. 
16. /d., art 6 (suspending for an indefinite period art. 131 of the Basic Law, with respect 
to the added territory. 
17. /d., art 30. 
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II. A PREVIEW OF COMING A TTRACfiONS 
The Treaty promises that other constitutional amendments 
will be recommended to Parliament for passage. Is The time avail-
able before October 3 was too short for details to be made final and 
political differences to be accommodated. This agenda includes: 
- a change in the relationship between the federal government and the states. 
- a possible change in the border between the city-state of Berlin (which will 
merge East and West Berlin) and surrounding Brandenburg. 
- consideration of the possibility of adding an affirmative list of "goals of the 
state,"' in addition to the more traditional list of human rights. This undoubtedly 
flows from the tradition in many East European countries of articulating many 
laudable goals as unenforceable constitutional aspirations. Transfer of such aspira-
tions into an effective, enforceable constitution will be a difficult challenge. 
- consideration of the question of the application of article 146, which would 
permit the adoption of an entirely new constitution by popular vote. The tentative 
way in which this obligation is formulated may indicate the limited likelihood of a 
new constitutional convention. 
None of these issues appears to be particularly pressing. Since the 
treaty obligation is only to recommend that the appropriate legisla-
tive bodies consider the issues during the next two years, they may 
see little progress beyond a few legislative hearings. 
Two other issues present more formidable legislative problems. 
They are the abortion issue and the return of (or compensation for) 
property taken by the D DR. 
One of the toughest problems of German unification was that 
of abortion. East German law freely permitted abortion. In West 
Germany abortions are permitted only to protect the life or health 
of the mother, when the fetus is deformed, in cases of rape, and-in 
limited circumstances-for "social reasons," e.g., the inability of 
the mother to care for the child. 
The West German law was the result of a decision of the Con-
stitutional Court which required parliament to provide a measure of 
legal protection to the fetus.I9 In the early 1970s, when the Social 
Democratic Party and the Free Democrats held a majority in par-
liament, the Parliament enacted an amendment to the Criminal 
Code which would have permitted abortion at the request of the 
mother, during the first trimester of pregnancy. A parliamentary 
minority from the Christian Democratic Union and several state 
governments (also aligned with the CDU) brought an immediate 
challenge, under procedures which allowed an "abstract review" of 
constitutionality. In a decision which took a tack opposite to that 
18. /d., art. 5. 
19. Decision of 25 February 1975, 39 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts I 
(1975) (BVerfGE 39, 1). 
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of the United States Supreme Court, the West German Constitu-
tional Court found that the fetus was constitutionally entitled to 
some legal protection from the fourteenth day after conception, at 
the latest.2o It based this decision on the constitutional protections 
of human dignity contained in the Basic Law. The Court imposed 
an interim solution which depended on the presence of certain "in-
dicators" before an abortion could be performed, and required the 
Parliament to enact new legislation. 
In 1976, the Parliament enacted the present form of the West 
German abortion law, which closely paralleled the interim solution 
established by the Court.21 The issue had both religious and polit-
ical overtones, since the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is as 
its name implies associated with religious groups. In East Ger-
many, in contrast, abortions had virtually become a normal means 
of birth control. 
Each side was insistent on maintaining its own law on this sub-
ject. The West German government, now led by the Christian 
Democrats, sought to enforce the Constitutional Court's mandate 
throughout the country. The East German CDU, leading its gov-
ernment, did not fully share the religious or ethical outlook of its 
western ally. The issue was made critical by the fact that, at least in 
parts of Berlin, the applicable law could vary depending on which 
side of the street the doctor's office was located. Despite the fact 
that East and West Berlin will be united under a common munici-
pal administration, the old law will remain applicable in the eastern 
sector. Since parts of the Basic Law are suspended in the former 
Eastern zone, even the judgment of the Constitutional Court requir-
ing protection for the fetus might not be applicable there. 
The solution reached in the unity treaty simply postpones the 
controversy. It leaves the East German law in place in the eastern 
area, immunized against constitutional attack, subject to the obliga-
tion of the federal parliament to enact new all-German legislation 
within two years. The text of the abortion provision is worth noting 
because of its convolution. In translation, it reads: 
It is the responsibility of the all-German legislature to adopt a regulation by 
December 31, 1992, which will protect pre-natal life and provide for the resolution 
of the conflict situations of pregnant women in a constitutional way, especially 
through legally secured entitlements of women to counselling and social assistance, 
better than is currently the case in both parts of Germany. In order to achieve this 
goal there will immediately be established, throughout [the former DDR territory], 
20. For a more thorough discussion of this decision in relation to the United States law, 
see Kommers, Abortion and the Constitution: United States and West Germany, 25 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 255 (1977). 
21. The current version is to be found in § 218 of the German Criminal Code. 
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a comprehensive network of counselling offices, operated by different providers with 
financial assistance from the federal government. The counselling offices are to be 
staffed, and financially supported so that they can fulfill their task of advising preg-
nant women and giving them necessary assistance--even after the birth takes place. 
If there is no resolution of the issue within the prescribed time period, the substan-
tive law [of East Germany] will continue to apply within [its former territory].22 
The result is thus a compromise. Abortions will remain freely 
available in the east until the new German parliament adopts a new 
acceptable, nationwide regulation. There is a promise of uniform 
regulation within two years; it is written in language which clearly 
opposes elective abortion. The ability of Parliament to enact such 
legislation will depend, however, on the election of a parliamentary 
majority supporting that course of action. While the Christian 
Democratic Union party in the western area clearly favors a more 
restrictive abortion law, its counterpart from the eastern area might 
well join with other political groups to block passage of such legisla-
tion through the Bundestag. Two factors seem to work in the other 
direction. First, the Bundestag is now under a constitutional and 
treaty obligation to resolve this issue by the end of 1992; the efficacy 
of that obligation should not be underestimated. A German legisla-
tor might see his or her function as merely deciding how best to 
implement this constitutional command. Second, any CDU govern-
ment which held the issue strongly could make the issue one of 
party loyalty and parliamentary confidence. In such events, mem-
bers of parliament-even those who opposed the position-might 
well vote for more restrictive laws.23 
Postponement of the issue may well serve the immediate pur-
pose of unity. It will, however, be a divisive issue in the first years 
of a united Germany. 
The other great compromise involved the constitutional provi-
sions protecting property against expropriation.24 During its exist-
ence, the communist DDR had engaged in a wide variety of 
expropriations. The earliest round, in 1945-49, had involved the 
22. Treaty of German Unity, supra note 8, at art. 31, para. 4. 
23. Another possibility would involve the invocation of a "legislative emergency" under 
article 81 of the Basic Law. This provision was inserted in 1949 at the insistence of the 
Western allies to prevent the kind of legislative paralysis which had sealed the fate of the 
Weimar Republic. It has never been used. It would involve the Federal Chancellor seeking 
an affirmative vote of confidence (by passage of the new abortion law). If that was rejected 
(and no other Chancellor was elected), the Federal President could call new elections. If he 
did not do so, the President and Chancellor could declare a legislative emergency. Then the 
Federal government could enact the law without the approval of the Bundestag, if the 
Bundesrat (Upper House) agreed. All of this would thus be dependent upon the Bundestag 
not replacing the Chancellor, the President not calling a new election, and the Bundesrat 
agreeing to the bill. The chances are remote. But if there is any current issue likely to create 
a legislative stalemate-for which article 81 was designed-it is surely the abortion question. 
24. Basic Law, supra note 6, at art. 14. 
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formal collectivization of most of East German agriculture. Later 
deprivations of property included outright expropriation and the 
seizure of property of exiles and refugees. Less direct deprivations 
were brought about as the establishment of low fixed rents, coupled 
with high taxes and expenses, led to "abandonments" of property. 
(It was not uncommon for the legally limited rents a landlord could 
collect to be less than the cost of the heat he was required to 
provide!) 
For former (or nominal) owners of property in the East, unifi-
cation brought with it hope for the protection or recovery of prop-
erty in the East, in accordance with article 14 of the Basic Law. 
While the Basic Law recognized a power of eminent domain-even 
for socialist nationalizations-it also required compensation and 
guaranteed the right to judicial review. The result would have been 
a litigator's dream, with potential suits respecting virtually every 
parcel of property in the entire former DDR. 
The treaty implements an agreement between the two govern-
ments which, in effect, partially suspends the guarantee of property 
rights.2s It splits the nationalizations into several categories. 
· Nationalizations which occurred in the period 1945-1949 are to be treated as 
"irreversible." In these cases the previous owners will be entitled neither to return 
of their property nor immediately to compensation. The new government will, 
however, "consider" making them eligible for payments from a fund previously 
used to assist those whose property was damaged or destroyed during the war. 
These nationalizations can formally be distinguished from later expropriations on 
several grounds. They were in part undertaken by the Soviet occupation authori-
ties, for whom the German government is not liable. They also antedate the enact-
ment of the Basic Law. 
- Property which was placed in trusteeship because its owners fled the DDR is 
to be returned. 
- Other property is to be returned to its owners, subject to several important 
qualifications. If the character of the property has changed (e.g. by construction of 
a housing project on it), there will be a claim to compensation only. Special rules 
apply to 1972 confiscations, which are being "unwound" in the process of privatiza-
tion. Exchanges and compensation may replace return of property. 
All of this is further modified by the treaty itself, which per-
mits the Parliament to nullify or reduce the obligations of the 
DDR.26 Since the obligation to compensate arises from the actions 
of the DDR, the Federal Parliament may be able to reduce or elimi-
nate it. 
The result is a peculiar and pragmatic mixture. Supposed 
guarantees of vested rights give way to social reality. Social reality 
has, however, awarded far more protection than one would have 
25. Treaty of German United, supra note 8, at Annex Ill. 
26. /d. at art. 4, para. 4 (amending Basic Law, art. 135a). 
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thought possible only a year earlier. The political process will bal-
ance the competing interests. Given the rigidity of the German sys-
tem of constitutional interpretation, formal action was necessary to 
allow any sensible result. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As in any merger and acquisition, the surviving entity emerges 
larger, and potentially stronger. The care devoted to preparation of 
a major legal analysis of the legal impact of merger is impressive. 
The flexibility of the Basic Law, which permitted the suspen-
sion or alteration of major constitutional limitations, is noteworthy 
in light of this major political event. If it had been less flexible, the 
political forces for unification might well have fractured it. Yet that 
flexibility might equally be exercised in less favorable ways. 
The most significant element is, however, the preservation of 
democratic processes and human rights standards in this constitu-
tional adjustment. Indeed, the record of the former West Germany 
on these key constitutional issues was one of the reasons for reten-
tion of a known quantity-the Basic Law-instead of opting for a 
unknown new constitution to govern a newly united Germany. 
